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POST CONVICTION RELIEF IN PENNSYLVANIA
Traditionally, a prisoner's remedy to test the legality of his
detention following conviction has been the writ of habeas corpus,'
although other common law remedies were available.2 Recently,
Pennsylvania adopted a uniform procedure for collateral review of
criminal proceedings in the form of the Post Conviction Hearing
Act.3 The Act specifically sets forth that it encompasses all previ-
ous common law and statutory procedures for collaterally con-
testing convictions obtained and sentences imposed without due
process of law.4 Under the Post Conviction Hearing Act a prisoner
files a petition alleging an error in his conviction or sentence,
which if judged to have merit will give rise to an evidenciary hear-
ing. If the petitioner carries his burden of proving the alleged er-
ror at the hearing, the court then grants appropriate relief. In
effect, the Post Conviction Hearing Act makes no substantive
changes in the law, but merely establishes a defined procedure for
asserting previously available post conviction relief. The Act in
no way effects the normal procedures in the trial court or on
direct appeal.5
Under the Act, failure to appeal a ruling or to raise an issue
at any proceeding actually held establishes a rebuttable presump-
tion that the petitioner knowingly and understandingly waived the
right to contest the ruling or issue.6 The apparent object of creat-
ing a waiver provision and a rebuttable presumption of waiver is
to prevent the perpetual repetition of petitions by the same prison-
er, but the question remains whether such a provision can be both
effective and equitable. The object of this Comment is to briefly
note the avenues of review open to a petitioner following convic-
tion and to discuss the operation and interpretation of the Post
Conviction Hearing Act.
1. The term "habeas corpus" as used here refers to habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum, which is the form of the writ issued pursuant to a petition
directed to a person who is detaining another and requiring him to make
a return thereon. Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611 (1960).
2. See discussion of the writ of coram nobis at text accompanying
notes 38-41 infra.
3. Hereinafter referred to as the PCHA or the Act. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 1180-1 et seq. (Supp. 1969). PA. R. Cami. P. 1501 to 1507.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-2 (Supp. 1969).
5. Id.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-4(c) (Supp. 1969).
I. DInCT REVIEW
The normal channel for attacking a conviction and sentence
in Pennsylvania is by filing post-trial motions 7 and, if relief is not
granted thereon, taking a direct appeal to the superior court based
on the dismissal of the motions.8 The post-trial motions and ap-
peal are a matter of right, and, if the appellant is an indigent, the
state is obligated to provide him with free counsel for the prepara-
tion and prosecution of these proceedings.9
Normally post-trial motions contain both a motion for a new
trial and a motion in arrest of judgment. Motions for new trial
are usually premised upon procedural errors o which the defendant
alleges prejudiced his trial." Although it was once held that a
motion for new trial was the proper remedy in the event that a
verdict is rendered contrary to the weight of evidence,12 the scope
of a motion in arrest of judgment has been statutorily expanded to
cover this situation.13 In passing upon the sufficiency of a motion
in arrest of judgment, the court must consider all the evidence re-
ceived at the trial, whether properly admitted or not,14 and give
the Commonwealth all reasonable inferences therefrom.'5
7. See PA. R. CPiM. P. 1123. See generally Commonwealth ex rel.
Shadd v. Myers, 423 Pa. 82, 223 A.2d 296 (1966).
8. Commonwealth ex rel. Shadd v. Myers, 423 Pa. 82, 223 A.2d 296
(1966).
9. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1962); Commonwealth v.
Silva, 415 Pa. 537, 204 A.2d 455 (1964), on remand from 206 Pa. Super.
745, 213 A.2d 686 (1965).
10. Normally a motion for new trial must be premised upon an ob-
jection made during trial. Commonwealth v. Raymond, 412 Pa. 194, 194
A.2d 150 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 999 (1964); Commonwealth v.
Donatelli, 202 Pa. Super. 565, 198 A.2d 338 (1964); Commonwealth v.
Murray, 202 Pa. Super. 272, 195 A.2d 183 (1963).
11. See Commonwealth v. Evans, 190 Pa. Super. 179, 154 A.2d 57
(1959), aff'd, 399 Pa. 387, 160 A.2d 407, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 899 (1960);
Commonwealth v. Oister, 201 Pa. Super. 251, 191 A.2d 851 (1963); Com-
monwealth v. Dumont, 72 Montg. 50, 5 Pa. D. & C.2d 558 (Pa. C.P. 1956).
12. Commonwealth v. Heller, 147 Pa. Super. 68, 24 A.2d 460 (1942);
Commonwealth v. Long, 131 Pa. Super. 28, 198 A. 474 (1938).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 871 (1964). Motion in arrest of judgment
is also available to challenge procedural irregularity on the face of the
record, however, relief will not be granted for mere technical defects, cleri-
cal errors, defects cured by plea or verdict or defects waived by going to
trial. See Commonwealth v. Weaver, 61 Pa. Super. 571 (1915); Common-
wealth v. Wood, 2 Pa. Super. 42 (1896); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 46 West.
13 (Pa. C.P. 1964). Relief should be granted where the judge erred in
overruling a demurrer to the evidence by the defense, Commonwealth
ex rel. Silva v. Rundle, 199 Pa. Super. 474, 186 A.2d 405 (1962); where
there is substantial contradiction in the testimony of the Commonwealth's
witnesses, Commonwealth v. Gazel, 185 Pa. Super. 91, 137 A.2d 814
(1958); or where the jury finds the defendant guilty of an unknown crime,
Commonwealth v. Kowatowski, 347 Pa. 445, 32 A.2d 905 (1943).
14. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 432 Pa. 319, 247 A.2d 783 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Crews, 429 Pa. 16, 239 A.2d 350 (1968); Commonwealth
v. Powell, 428 Pa. 275, 214 A.2d 119 (1968).
15. Cases cited note 14 supra.
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As noted, if relief is denied on the post-trial motions, the
prisoner may take an appeal' 6 therefrom to the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court as a matter of right.1 7 The right is statutory, not
constitutional, although the assistance of counsel thereon is a con-
stitutional right.1 8 Supersedeas does not follow automatically on
appeal, but any judge may allow supersedeas and set appropriate
bail.19 The general rule is that one may only appeal from a judg-
ment of sentence,20 thus matters interlocutory in nature are not
appealable unless expressly made so by statute.21 Naturally, this
right to appeal is subject to the general rule that anything not
raised in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.' 2 As will be noted later in this Comment,23 if a petitioner
knowingly waives his right to a direct post-trial review of his con-
viction, he will also be deemed to waive the right to subsequent
collateral review.
Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not a matter of
right, but must be specially allowed by the superior court or by
allocatur from any justice of the supreme court.
24
16. Matters which can be raised on appeal include anything which
could previously be taken to the court on writ of error, appeal or certiorari.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 182 (Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1131 (1953). As such it has been said that the courts must look to the
particular action giving rise to the appeal to determine what powers they
are to exercise. See Petition of Bell, 396 Pa. 592, 152 A.2d 731 (1959); Com-
monwealth v. Fisher, 184 Pa. Super. 75, 132 A.2d 739 (1957). On common
law writ of error, a judgment was reviewed with reference to alleged er-
rors which were noted by taking exceptions in the trial court; appeal was
the method of review of equity proceedings, and certiorari presented
the record to the appellate court for correction of errors upon its face.
Appeal of Long, 134 Pa. 641, 19 A. 806 (1890).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 182 (Supp. 1969). Note that on feloni-
ous murder convictions the right to appeal is directly to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 191.4 (Supp. 1969).
18. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Commonwealth v. Silva,
415 Pa. 537, 204 A.2d 455 (1964), on remand from 206 Pa. Super. 745, 213
A.2d 686 (1965).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 182 (Supp. 1969).
20. Commonwealth v. Washington, 428 Pa. 131, 236 A.2d 772 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Haushalter, 423 Pa. 353, 223 A.2d 726 (1966).
21. Commonwealth v. Washington, 428 Pa. 131, 236 A.2d 772 (1968).
Interlocutory may normally be determined as an order lacking sufficient
elements of finality. It should be noted that interlocutory rulings may be
challenged following conviction. The rationale for the rule is that any
prejudice created by a ruling can be corrected on post conviction rule.
22. See Capecci v. Liberty Corp., 406 Pa. 197, 176 A.2d 664 (1962);
Woldow v. Dever, 374 Pa. 370, 97 A.2d 777 (1953); and cases cited in
note 10 supra.
23. See discussion at notes 74-80 and accompanying text infra.
24. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Silva, 415 Pa. 537, 204 A.2d 455 (1964),
II. COLLATERAL REVIEW
Any method of challenging a judgment except in the proceed-
ings in which it is rendered or on direct appeal is termed a collateral
attack.2  The two principal common law methods of collateral
attack in Pennsylvania were the writs of habeas corpus and coram
nobis, the former of which was later codified.2 6 Since the Post
Conviction Hearing Act replaced all common law and statutory
procedures for collateral attack and specifically habeas corpus and
coram nobis,27 it might be well to make a brief note of how these
writs operated.
A. Habeas Corpus
Originally the writ of habeas corpus could be used only to
challenge the jurisdiction of the convicting court;28 however, it
is quite clear that one could be convicted at a trial where the court
had jurisdiction but where the defendant's constitutional rights
were violated. Therefore, the rule developed such that now the
writ is available to test the merits of any criminal trial.29
Whatever else, the writ is not a substitute for an appeal 0
because habeas corpus will not lie to test the ordinary procedural
errors at trial;"' only if such errors are enough to cause the entire
detention to become unlawful is the writ available as a possible
remedy. 32 Normally this means there must be some constitutional
infirmity in the regularity of the proceedings.3 3 Note that the
on remand from 206 Pa. Super. 745, 213 A.2d 686 (1965). It should also
be noted that appeals to the superior court must be taken within forty-five
days from sentencing, and appeal from the superior to the supreme court
must be taken and perfected within forty-five days from judgment. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1136 (1953).
25. See A.D. Juillard & Co. v. Johnson, 166 F. Supp. 577, 586 (S..D
N.Y. 1957).
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,§ 1901 et seq. (1967).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-2 (Supp. 1969).
28. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); Passmore Williamson's
Case, 26 Pa. 9 (1855).
29. Commonwealth ex tel. Stevens v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1, 213 A.2d 613
(1965).
30. See Eagles v. Samuals, 329 U.S. 304 (1923); Commonwealth ex
rel. Ryan v. Rundle, 411 Pa. 613, 192 A.2d 362 (1963); Commonwealth ex rel.
Bolish v. Banmiller, 396 Pa. 129, 151 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 898
(1959).
31. Contentions that the indictment was defective, that there was a
variance between the indictment and the proof at trial, or that the evi-
dence was insufficient for conviction have all been held to be improperly
raised on habeas corpus. See Commonwealth ex rel. Roseborough v.
Myers, 202 Pa. Super. 31, 195 A.2d 152 (1963); Commonwealth ex rel
Sukaly v. Maroney, 201 Pa. Super. 117, 191 A.2d 893 (1963); Common-
wealth ex rel. Miller v. Meyers, 192 Pa. Super. 128, 159 A.2d 764 (1960).
Likewise habeas corpus cannot be used to test the adequacy of the court's
charge at the trial. Commonwealth ex rel. Gobert v. Myers, 182 Pa.
Super. 254, 126 A.2d 525 (1956).
32. See cases cited in note 30 supra.
33. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. McKenna v. Cavell, 423 Pa. 387,
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guilt or innocence of the petitioner plays no part in this collateral
challenge, only the legality of detention being relevant.
34
The mechanics for bringing habeas corpus and for the court's
determination of its merits are similar to those described below
for a petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act.85 Indeed,
it was partially due to the lack of a comprehensively defined
habeas corpus procedure that the new Act was promulgated.36
Even though the Post Conviction Hearing Act states that it
replaces habeas corpus in criminal matters, it has been stated
that there are limited circumstances where the old writ will
still lie for collateral relief from conviction and sentence. 7
B. Coram Nobis
Most petitions under the Post Conviction Hearing Act are con-
cerned with errors which could previously have been attacked by
habeas corpus; however, the Act specifically provides that it shall
include any claims which could previously have been brought by
coram nobis.3
s
The writ of error coram nobis to nullify or reform a judg-
ment lies only where facts exist extrinsic of the record,
unknown and unknowable by the exercise of diligence at
the time of its rendition, and which would, if known,
have prevented the judgment either in its entirety or in
the form in which it was rendered.3 9
The writ did not issue to re-examine or retry the original issue
of the trial, which is the purpose of a new trial, but only to produce
facts which would have prevented a conviction or clearly indicate
a miscarriage of justice.40 Relief could not be granted under
coram nobis for facts arising subsequent to the judgment, and it
224 A.2d 616 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Hilberry v. Maroney, 417 Pa.
534, 207 A.2d 794 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Elliott v. Baldi, 373 Pa.
489, 96 A.2d 122, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 976 (1953); Commonwealth ex rel.
Shultz v. Smith, 139 Pa. Super. 357, 11 A.2d 656 (1940).
34. See United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Chief Probation Officer, 373
F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1967).
35. See discussion at text accompanying notes 53-58 infra.
36. Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1, 11-12, 213 A.2d
613, 619-20 (1965).
37. Commonwealth v. Tinson, 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969).
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-2 (Supp. 1969).
39. Commonwealth v. Harris, 351 Pa. 325, 327, 41 A.2d 688, 691 (1945).
40. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 351 Pa. 325, 41 A.2d 688 (1945);
Commonwealth ex rel. v. Ashe, 19 Erie 24, 28 Pa. D. & C. 573 (Pa. C.P.
1937).
had to appear that the after discovered evidence was not known
nor could not have been known to the defendant at the time of
trial.
41
III. POST CONVICTION HEARING ACT
A. Background
As noted the Post Conviction Hearing Act replaced all common
law and statutory procedures for collateral attack in Pennsylvania
existing at the time of its enactment. 42 The Act has been attacked
as an unconstitutional repeal of the writ of habeas corpus; however,
the courts have held that the Post Conviction Hearing Act does
not suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but merely gives that writ
and others a well defined procedure.43
Until enactment of the Post Conviction Hearing Act the sub-
stance of the collateral remedies was fairly well stated, but the
procedural aspects of these remedies, especially as to waiver of the
right to raise an issue, were never clearly defined, even in the
statutory version of habeas corpus. 44 Several cases indicate that
waiver of the right to litigate the errors complained of was a sec-
ondary consideration often confused with res judicata, which doc-
trine was generally held not to apply to collateral remedies. 45
Originally it was held that only when a petition was repetitious of
averments contained in previous petitions would it be dismissed as
"abuse of writ. '46 However, shortly before the effective date of
41. See Commonwealth v. Mathews, 356 Pa. 100, 51 A.2d 609 (1947);
Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 13 Beaver 251 (Pa. C.P. 1951); Common-
wealth v. Manown, 35 West. 31 (Pa. C.P. 1951); and cases cited in note 40
supra. A prisoner convicted for statutory rape was released when the peti-
tion brought to the court's attention that the alleged victim bore a bad
reputation for chastity in the community, was infected with venereal dis-
ease, had solicited various sexual acts for a fee, and was the chief witness
in five similar pending cases. Commonwealth ex tel. v. Ashe, 19 Erie 24,
28 Pa. D. & C. 573 (Pa. C.P. 1937). In another case the convicted party was
released when it was brought to the court's attention that three persons
were arrested and pleaded guilty to the same crime, and the prosecutor
stated that he had been absolutely wrong in his original identification.
Commonwealth v. Valerino, 32 Pa. D. & C. 363 (C.P. Phila. Pa. 1938).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-2 (Supp. 1969).
43. Moss v. Pennsylvania, 257 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Pa. 1966); United
States ex tel. Miller v. Russell, 256 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Com-
monwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83, 233 A.2d 530 (1967).
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1901 et seq. (1967).
45. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex tel. Spader v. Myers, 196 Pa. Super.
19, 173 A.2d 686 (1961); Commonwealth ex tel. DeSimore v. Carell, 185 Pa.
Super. 131, 138 A.2d 688 (1958); Commonwealth ex Tel. Dote v. Burke,
172 Pa. Super. 400, 94 A.2d 87, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 966 (1953).
46. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Bishop v. Maroney, 399 Pa. 208,
159 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 846 (1960); Commonwealth ex rel. Spa-
der v. Myers, 196 Pa. Super. 19, 173 A.2d 686 (1961); Commonwealth
ex tel. Larozny v. Dennison, 186 Pa. Super. 136, 140 A.2d 461 (1958);




the Post Conviction Hearing Act, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania stated that a contention not previously considered on the
merits could be foreclosed if the claim could have been raised on a
prior petition but was deliberately withheld in order to preserve
the claim for subsequent petitions.
47
The general lack of uniformity of procedural processes prior
to the Post Conviction Hearing Act led to a system whereby
prisoners received what amounted to arbitrary review of their
convictions and sentences. The need for legislation was indicated
in a 1965 Pennsylvania Supreme court opinion:
That the scope of the writ has developed greatly with the
exigencies of the time as a post conviction remedy seems
so undeniable that extensive citation and comparision of
cases might now well seem a needless exercise. There is no
other comprehensive method of collateral attack in
Pennsylvania. Thus this growth of the writ is not sur-
prising or unwarranted in view of our continuing efforts
to provide a full hearing for claims of federal constitutional
violations and in the face of the present urgent necessity
for a state post conviction avenue which will afford an
adequate corrective process for hearing and determining
alleged violations of federal constitutional guarantees. 48
This urgent necessity noted by the Court was met with the Post
Conviction Hearing Act which affords all remedies previously
available to a prisoner, but defines the rules within which both he
and the courts must work.
Although the theoretical basis for the Post Conviction Hearing
Act was to create a uniform and equitable procedure for collateral
review, there were also practical considerations involved. The
courts had been flooded with habeas corpus petitions, many of them
repetitious or slightly different than previous petitions filed by
the same individual. Since the thrust of collateral attack is to pro-
vide one all inclusive review of the lawfulness of sentence and con-
viction, the legislature attempted to create a system whereby a
prisoner is encouraged to set forth all his grievances on his first
petition. The result was inclusion in the Act of a comprehensive
waiver provision, designed to disallow repeated filings of petitions
for collateral relief 49 while complying with the federal waiver
standard to be discussed below.50
47. See Commonwealth ex rel. Bordner v. Russell, 422 Pa. 365, 221
A.2d 177 (1966).
48. Commonwealth ex tel. Stevens v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1, 11-12, 213 A.2d
613, 619-20 (1965).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-4 (Supp. 1969).
50. See discussion at notes 81-86 and accompanying text infra.
B. General Provisions
To be eligible for relief under the Act one must initiate a
proceeding by filing a petition and must prove:
(a) that he has been convicted of a crime,
(b) that he is imprisoned in Pennsylvania on parole
or probation,
(c) that his conviction or sentence resulted from a
denial of due process of law,51
(d) and, that the error resulting in his conviction and
sentence has not been litigated or waived.
52
The mechanics consist of the prisoner submitting copies of his
petition to the clerk of the court wherein he was convicted and
sentenced, which petition must set forth the proceedings leading to
his confinement, the general nature of error complained of and
sufficient facts to support his conclusion.53 In addition the peti-
tion must set forth all previous proceedings which the petitioner
has taken to secure relief from his sentence or conviction. Prac-
tical implementation of this sytem is attained by providing the
prisoner with standardized forms upon which he must check one of
a series of boxes beside various constitutional errors that allegedly
affected his conviction. 54 These conclusions of law must be sup-
ported by statements of fact from the petitioner himself. The
51. The act specifically sets forth thirteen reasons which petitioner
can allege have lead to his unlawful detention:
(1) The introduction of evidence obtained pursuant to an un-
lawful arrest;
(2) The introduction of evidence obtained by an unconstitutional
search and seizure;
(3) The introduction of a coerced confession into evidence;
(4) The introduction into evidence of a statement obtained in
the absence of counsel at a time when representation is con-
stitutionally required;
(5) The infringement of his privilege against self-incrimination
under either Federal or State law;
(6) The denial of his constitutional right to representation by
competent counsel;
(7) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced;
(8) The unconstitutional supression of evidence by the State;
(9) The unconstitutional use by the State of perjured testimony;
(10) The obstruction by State officials of petitioner's right of
appeal;
(11) His being twice placed in jeopardy;
(12) The abridgement in any other way of any right guaranteed by
the constitution or laws of the State or the constitution or
laws of the United States, including a right that was not rec-
ognized as existing at the time of the trial if the constitution
requires retrospective application of that right; or
(13) The unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evi-
dence that has subsequently become available and that would
have affected the outcome of the trial if it had been intro-
duced.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-3(c) (Supp. 1969).
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-3 (Supp. 1969).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-6 (Supp. 1969).
54. See PA. R. CPaM. P. 1501 which, in addition to the averments
listed in note 61, supra, has another possible due process error listed, i.e.




form also has space for noting the type of relief requested and to
request appointment of counsel to represent the petitioner.
Upon receipt of the petition the clerk of the court immediately
dockets the case and serves a copy of the petition on the district
attorney. 5  The district attorney is required to file an answer to
the petition within twenty days from service upon him. 6 It should
be noted that the petitioner is not given the right to have counsel
assist him in filing his petition, file a supplemental brief, or present
oral argument on his behalf prior to the grant of an evidentiary
hearing.57 However, an obvious by-product of the free-amend-
ment provision of the Act is to encourage court appointed counsel
to amend the petition originally filed by the petitioner himself."'
C. Evidentiary Hearing
Perhaps the most important part of the Act concerns whether
the petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. To be eligible
for such a hearing the petitioner must allege facts which are not
contradicted by the record and which if proven would entitle him
to relief.5 9 The mere checking of boxes, i.e., allegation of legal con-
clusions, is an insufficient basis upon which to receive a hearing.6 0
Likewise the court can deny an evidentiary hearing on the peti-
tion if the claim is patently frivolous and without support on the
record.61 In considering the need for a hearing, the court reviews
the petition itself, the answer of the district attorney, and the
record of all previously held proceedings.6 2
If a hearing is granted then it must be a full and fair one at
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-6 (Supp. 1969).
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-8 (Supp. 1969).
57. See Commonwealth v. Galloway, 212 Pa. Super. 154, 239 A.2d 893
(1968). Summary disposition of a petition, without appointing counsel is
permitted only "when a previous petition involving the same issue or
issues has been finally determined adversely to the petitioner and he . . .
was represented by counsel in proceedings thereon." PA. R. CRam. P.
1504; Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 436 Pa. 141, 259 A.2d 460 (1969).
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-7 (Supp. 1969).
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,§ 1180-9 (Supp. 1969); see Commonwealth
v. Rush, 212 Pa. Super. 437, 243 A.2d 159 (1969); cf. Commonwealth v.
Cline, 210 Pa. Super. 63, 231 A.2d 430 (1967).
60. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83, 233 A.2d 530
(1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Kearns v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 369, 223 A.2d
706 (1966); Commonwealth v. Brayboy, 209 Pa. Super. 10, 223 A.2d 878
(1966).
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-9 (Supp. 1969).
62. See generally Commonwealth ex rel. Welch v. Maroney, 425 Pa.
591, 229 A.2d 737 (1967); Commonwealth v. Nahodil, 212 Pa. Super. 77,
239 A.2d 840 (1968); Commonwealth v. Cline, 210 Pa. Super. 63, 231 A.2d
430 (1967).
which the petitioner has a right to private or appointed counsel.,
After appointment counsel may move to amend the petition which
his client has previously submitted.U4 At the hearing the peti-
tioner has a right to be present, to subpoena any necessary wit-
nesses and may present affidavits, depositions, and relevant por-
tions of the record for the judge's consideration. 5 If the court
finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall order such relief as it deems
ordinate, e.g., rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, discharge or
correction of sentence. 6 Any prisoner aggrieved by the finding of
the hearing court may take an appeal within thirty days of the
finding,6 7 and is entitled to the assistance of counsel thereon. 8
D. Dismissal By Way of Waiver or Prior Litigation
One of the requirements for relief is that the alleged error in
the conviction and sentence has not been previously fully litigated
or waived. Section 4 of the Post Conviction Hearing Act provides:
(a) For the purpose of this act, an issue is finally
litigated if:
(1) It has been raised in the trial court, the
trial court has ruled on the merits of the issue, and the
petitioner has knowingly and understandingly failed to
appeal the trial court's ruling; or
(2) The Superior Court of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania has ruled on the merits of the issue and
the petitioner has knowingly and understandingly failed
to avail himself of further appeals; or
(3) The Supreme Court of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania has ruled on the merits of the issue.
(b) For the purposes of this act, an issue is waived
if:
(1) The petitioner knowingly and understand-
ingly failed to raise it and it could have been raised before
the trial, at the trial, on appeal, in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding or any other proceeding actually conducted, or in
a prior proceeding actually initiated under this act; and
(2) The petitioner is unable to prove the exist-
ence of extraordinary circumstances to justify his failure
to raise the issue.
(c) There is a rebuttable presumtpion that a failure
to appeal a ruling or to raise an issue is a knowing and
understanding failure.6 9
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-12 (Supp. 1969); PA. R. CalM. P.
1503.
64. See Commonwealth v. Rivella, 215 Pa. Super. 143, 257 A.2d 312
(1969); Commonwealth v. Galloway, 212 Pa. Super. 154, 239 A.2d 893
(1968).
65. PA. STAT. A-x. tit. 19, § 1180-9 (Supp. 1969).
66. PP. STAT. ANx. tit. 19, § 1180-10 (Supp. 1969).
67. PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 19, § 1180-11 (Supp. 1969).
68. See Commonwealth v. Walters, 431 Pa. 74, 244 A.2d 757 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Tolbert, 430 Pa. 167, 242 A.2d 265 (1968).
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-4 (Supp. 1969).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Except in the case of frivolous claims,7 0 the Act demands that
a petitioner have a hearing and ruling on the merits of the alleged
error or that he have waived his right thereto. 1 As such, a com-
plete litigation by means other than the Post Conviction Hearing
Act will serve to block petitioner's claim. If the contested issue
was raised at the trial court and unsuccessfully argued on appeal it
cannot again later be brought up,72 nor can it be relitigated after
it has been once raised and considered on a post conviction peti-
tion.7
8
Likewise a knowing and understanding waiver will preclude
the petitioner from receiving relief under the Act.7 4 It should be
noted that waiver herein is not used in the sense of whether the
constitutional right itself was waived, but rather whether the
opportunity to litigate an asserted denial of the right was waived
by failure to raise it in a prior proceeding.7 5 The petitioner waives
his right to collateral attack if he knowingly and understandingly
fails to raise the issue and it could have been raised before trial, at
trial, on appeal, on collateral attack, or at any proceeding actually
held.7 6 Failure to apply for collateral relief does not waive the
petitioner's right to raise the issue, although failure to raise the
issue at a collateral proceeding actually held constitutes a waiver
as to all issues not raised." The waiver provision denies an
evidenciary hearing to the petitioner when it is clear from the
record that he knew of his opportunity to raise the issue but did
not do so. 78 In light of this, it is very important for the district
attorney and sentencing judge to be sure that the trial transcript is
clear as to the defendant having been made aware of his constitu-
tional rights. In silent record cases, this waiver provision, together
with the presumption that counseled petitioners knowingly waived
their rights to raise an issue,79 has the same effect.80 The result in
70. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-9 (Supp. 1969), and text of
note 57 supra.
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1180-4, 9 (Supp. 1969).
72. Commonwealth v. Gates, 429 Pa. 453, 240 A.2d 815 (1968).
73. Commonwealth v. Butler, 435 Pa. 46, 254 A.2d 645 (1969).
74. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Satchell, 430 Pa. 443, 243 A.2d 381
(1968); Commonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306, 237 A.2d 172 (1968); Com-
monwealth v. Raysor, 212 Pa. Super. 282, 243 A.2d 160 (1968).
75. See Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83, 233 A.2d 530 (1967).
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-4(b) (2) (Supp. 1969).
77. See generaliy PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-4 (Supp. 1969).
78. E.g., Commonwealth v. Scatena, 432 Pa. 535, 248 A.2d 17 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Bolognese, 428 Pa. 405, 239 A.2d 307 (1968); Common-
wealth ex rel. Harbold v. Rundle, 427 Pa. 117, 233 A.2d 261 (1967); Com-
monwealth v. Wallace, 427 Pa. 110, 233 A.2d 218 (1967).
79. See discussion at notes 87-92 and accompanying text infra.
either case is that a petitioner can be prevented from securing even
one review of the legality of his detention.
The reason for the adoption of the knowing and understanding
waiver standard was due, in large part, to the friction created by
different standards for waiver by state and federal habeas corpus
proceedings."" Although the standards set for collateral review in
state habeas corpus proceedings are a matter of state, not federal,
law, state prisoners can still go into the federal courts to vindicate
deprivation of federal constitutional rights,82 i.e., after exhausting
his state remedies a prisoner still may petition for federal habeas
corpus. The result of the dual standard was that the state court
could base waiver of a right to raise an issue on a procedural over-
sight, but the federal court would grant a hearing because the
petitioner had not made a knowing and understanding waiver at the
state level.8 3 If the state petitioner carried his burden of proof at
the federal evidentiary hearing, appropriate relief could be
granted.8 4 The applicable federal standard for waiver of the right
to raise an issue collaterally was succinctly set forth in Fay v.
Noia: 8 5
If a habeas applicant, after consultation with compe-
tent counsel or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly
forwent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal
claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or
any other reasons that can fairly be described as the de-
liberate by-passing of state procedure, then it is open to the
federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if the state
courts refused to entertain his federal claims on the
merits-though of course only after the federal court has
satisfied itself, by holding a hearing or by some other
means, of the facts bearing upon the applicants default.
[citations omitted]. At all events we wish it clearly under-
80. E.g., Commonwealth v. Black, 433 Pa. 150, 249 A.2d 561 (1969);
Commonwealth v. Linde, 432 Pa. 324, 248 A.2d 235 (1968); Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 431 Pa. 552, 246 A.2d 345 (1968).
81. The provisions governing federal habeas corpus are found at 28
U.S.C. § 2241 et seq. (1964).
82. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963):
A defendant by committing a procedural default may be de-
barred from challenging his conviction in state courts even on
federal constitutional grounds. But a forfeiture of remedies does
not legitimize the unconstitutional conduct by which his conviction
was procured.
Id. at 428. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
83. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963):
Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas
corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant
did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court,
either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding. In
other words a federal evidentiary hearing is required unless the
state court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the
relevant facts.
Id. at 312-13.
84. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83, 233 A.2d 530 (1967).
85. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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stood that the standard here put forth depends on the
considered choice of the petitioner. [citations omitted]. A
choice made by counsel not particiapted in by the peti-
tioner does not automatically bar relief. Nor does a state
court's finding of waiver bar independent determination of
the question by the federal courts on habeas for waiver
affecting federal rights is a federal question.8 6
Since Fay required a knowing and understanding waiver of the
right to raise an issue, the state was forced to adopt the same stand-
ard to prevent differences in state and federal collateral relief.
E. Presumption of Waiver
Since the initiation of the Post Conviction Hearing Act, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has often stated that the Pennsyl-
vania standard of waiver and the federal standard are the same.
8 7
The only embellishment attached to the federal standard, as set
forth in the Post Conviction Hearing Act, is "[t] here is a re-
buttable presumption that a failure to appeal a ruling or to raise
an issue is a knowing or understanding failure. 8 8 The interpreta-
tion has been that the presumption only arises where the petitioner
had counsel to make objections in the lower court, to apprise the
petitioner of his right to direct appeal, or of his right to raise cer-
tain issues by collateral proceedings and appeal therefrom.8 9 Since
the actual fact of intelligent waiver of the right to raise the issue
would be difficult to prove, this presumption seems to have been
included to prevent the petitioner from merely alleging that he has
not waived the right to raise an issue in order to get by this hurdle
on the way to an evidentiary hearing.
One case discussing the presumption suggested that it arises
because the court can rely on competency of counsel to protect
all of the petitioner's available remedies.9 0 Such reasoning leads to
the conclusion that the presumption may not arise when one is not
represented by free or appointed counsel,9 ' even if he rejects the
right to have counsel appointed. Since the burden of proving a
86. Id. at 439.
87. E.g., Commonwealth v. Satchell, 430 Pa. 443, 243 A.2d 381 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 429 Pa. 89, 239 A.2d 793 (1968); Commonwealth
v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83, 233 A.2d 530 (1967).
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-4(c) (Supp. 1969).
89. E.g., Commonwealth v. Satchell, 430 Pa. 443, 243 A.2d 381
(1968); Commonwealth v. Kizer, 428 Pa. 99, 236 A.2d 515 (1967); Com-
monwealth v. Hammond, 213 Pa. Super. 190, 245 A.2d 654 (1968); Common-
wealth v. Johnson, 212 Pa. Super. 158, 239 A.2d 867 (1968).
90. Commonwealth v. Satchell, 430 Pa. 443, 243 A.2d 381 (1968).
91. See Commonwealth v. Mumford, 430 Pa. 451, 243 A.2d 440 (1968).
knowing and understanding waiver is on the Commonwealth,9 2
it would seem to be in its interest to assure representative counsel
in all appropriate cases.
F. Extraordinary Circumstances
Where the court feels that the Post Conviction Hearing Act
petition has no merit because of waiver, it cannot summarily dis-
miss the petition but should send it back in order for petitioner to
note any extraordinary circumstances which might excuse the
waiver: 9
The reasons for this rule are quite simple. The ques-
tion of waiver is a complicated legal one. There may be
"extraordinary circumstances" which will justify petition-
er's failure to raise the issue. [citation omitted]. There
may have been an intervening change in the law which will
now entitle him to relief. [citation omitted]. And failure
to raise an issue constitutes only a rebuttable presump-
tion of waiver. [citation omitted]. These are not the
kinds of issues which we can expect an uncounseled peti-
tioner to adequately deal with. [citation omitted]. As we
said in Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra, [c]ounsel's
ability to frame the issues in a legally meaningful fashion
insures the trial court that all relevant considerations will
be brought to its attention.
4
So where the petitioner alleges facts which if proven would be
sufficient to afford relief on his second Post Conviction Hearing
Act petition, the proper action is to send the petition back for
amendment. 95 However, where the issue has been previously liti-
gated, the court may summarily dismiss the petition.9 6 Likewise,
where the petitioner raises new facts on appeal from the dismissal
from any petition, the appellate court will take them into consid-
eration.
97
Even though petitioner has been represented by counsel and
the presumption of waiver arises, it can be overcome by alleging
extraordinary circumstances.9 8 One example of such extraordi-
nary circumstances arose when the petitioner's counsel failed to
raise an available right of confrontation argument before the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which argument would have been
supported by two United States Supreme Court cases decided more
92. See Commonwealth v. Zaffina, 432 Pa. 435, 248 A.2d 5 (1968).
93. Commonwealth v. Minnick, 436 Pa. 42, 258 A.2d 515 (1969); Com-
monwealth v. Johnson, 431 Pa. 522, 246 A.2d 245 (1968); Commonwealth
v. Satchell, 430 Pa. 443, 243 A.2d 381 (1968).
94. Commonwealth v. Minnick, 436 Pa. 42, 45, 258 A.2d 515, 516-17
(1969).
95. See Commonwealth v. Cordell, 436 Pa. 477, 260 A.2d 748 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Satchell, 430 Pa. 443, 243 A.2d 381 (1968).
96. See note 57 supra.
97. Commonwealth v. Peyton, 431 Pa. 101, 244 A.2d 646 (1968).
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1180-4(b) (2) (Supp. 1969).
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than nine months before counsel's presentation.99 The lower court
held that the petitioner had waived his right to raise the con-
frontation issue. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that when
an available remedy is ignored by counsel for no apparent reason,
this cannot be considered a deliberate choice by the petitioner.
The court stated that failure of a layman to appreciate the impli-
cations of a Supreme Court ruling within nine months of the de-
cision constituted extraordinary circumstances. 100 However, the
case also seems to stand for the proposition that ineffectiveness
of counsel overcomes the presumption of waiver.10 '
G. Avoiding Waiver and Presumption of Waiver
As noted above, 102 the petitioner should not be bound by de-
cisions of his counsel which are not guided by any apparent
strategy, so if there is a mere oversight in not raising an issue at
trial, the petitioner should not be bound by his counsel's mistake.10'
In order to insure himself of a hearing, it therefore appears that
petitioner need only allege facts which, if proven, would rebut the
presumption that his attorney fully informed him of his rights
and the various available courses of action, e.g., that counsel had
failed to inform him of his right to appeal. Similarly, it has been
held that even if the petitioner has been advised of his right to
appeal, but the fear of receiving the death penalty has played a sig-
nificant part in his not taking advantage of the appeal, then there
has not been a knowing waiver of that right. 0 4 Therefore, the
Commonwealth cannot rely upon failure to raise issues on appeal
to constitute a waiver of that right in the preceding situation. 0 5
Presently many petitioners avoid the waiver doctrine by al-
leging that they have been denied their right to appeal and to have
free counsel appointed to assist in the appeal as provided for in
Douglas v. California0 6 In cases where the record is silent on
this point,10 7 the court must grant an evidentiary hearing to de-
99. Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 429 Pa. 89, 239 A.2d 793 (1968).
100. Id. at 97, 239 A.2d at 797.
101. Id.
102. See discussion at notes 98-101 and accompanying text infra.
103. Probably the only sure way to determine what objections were
not made and issues not raised would be to hold an evidentiary hearing at
which trial counsel was present.
104. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Commonwealth v. Barnosky,
436 Pa. 59, 258 A.2d 512 (1969).
105. Cases cited note 104 supra.
106. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
107. A silent record case is one where there is no transcript of a col-
loquy between the appellant and some other party to his original proceed-
termine the merits of this claim. If the Commonwealth cannot
rebut the petitioner's allegations, 0 he must be granted motions
for a new trial nunc pro tunc.10 9 The Commonwealth can prove
the petitioner's knowledge of his right to appeal by using parts of
the record or the testimony of former counsel, the sentencing judge
or other appropriate party. However, with regard to waiver of
the right to raise the denial of appeal issue on a collateral attack,
it has been held that the Commonwealth must prove the uncoun-
seled petitioner knew of his right to appeal and knew he could
raise this issue on previous uncounseled petitions. 110
Clearly the waiver concept cannot apply in the case of excul-
patory after discovered evidence"' or when the constitutional
guarantee upon which the petitioner relies was not recognized un-
til after his trial or any proceeding held subsequent thereto.112
Recently a petitioner was granted the right to an appeal nunc pro
tunc based upon deprivation of his Douglas rights," 3 even though
the Commonwealth alleged that not raising this issue on previous
petitions constituted a waiver of the right to raise it.' 1 4 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the waiver argument be-
cause all but one of the petitions had been entered before Douglas
v. California'15 was decided, and the one petition filed after that
decision was uncounseled. 1 6 Likewise it has been held that a
petition filed after a decision recognizing the inadmissiblity of
tacit admissions and failing to raise that issue did not waive the
right to raise the tacit admission issue on a subsequent petition." 7
The reasoning was that although the inadmissibility of tacit ad-
ings affirmatively showing that the defendant was made aware of his
rights to appeal and, if indigent, to have free counsel appointed to assist
with the appeal.
108. Commonwealth v. Gist, 433 Pa. 101, 249 A.2d 351 (1969), held
that where petitioner alleges that he was not told of his right to appeal and
the record is silent thereon, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving
a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right.
109. See Commonwealth v. Zaffina, 432 Pa. 435, 248 A.2d 5 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Mumford, 430 Pa. 451, 243 A.2d 440 (1968); Common-
wealth v. Wilson, 430 Pa. 1, 241 A.2d 760 (1968).
110. Commonwealth v. Zaffina, 432 Pa. 435, 248 A.2d 5 (1968).
111. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1123(c) which allows motion for new trial
based upon after discovered evidence not later than two years after judg-
ment.
112. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Herge, 436 Pa. 542, 260 A.2d 787
(1970); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 433 Pa. 195, 249 A.2d 307 (1969);
Commonwealth v. Stevens, 429 Pa. 593, 240 A.2d 536 (1968); Commonwealth
v. Cheeks, 429 Pa. 89, 239 A.2d 793 (1968).
113. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), held that to deny an
indigent appellant free counsel for his appeal is unequal protection of the
laws under the Constitution.
114. Commonwealth v. Herge, 436 Pa. 542, 260 A.2d 787 (1970).
115. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
116. Commonwealth v. Herge, 436 Pa. 542, 551 n.5, 260 A.2d 787, 791
n.5 (1970).
117. Commonwealth v. Stevens, 429 Pa. 593, 240 A.2d 536 (1968).
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missions was decided before the submitting of the petition, the
case making that decision retroactive was decided after the peti-
tion was filed and, therefore, justified the petitioner in not having
previously raised the tacit admission issue.
118
H. Guilty Pleas
When a defendant pleads guilty to the offense charged, he is
deemed to waive all non-jurisdictional defects of the proceeding. 19
Therefore interference with the right to appeal of a petitioner hav-
ing pleaded guilty does not constitute grounds for relief on a Post
Conviction Hearing Act petition. This is because the only issues
which the petitioner having pleaded guilty could raise on appeal,
i.e. voluntariness of his plea and legality of sentence, can also be
raised on collateral attack.120 Naturally, these issues will be con-
sidered on the collateral attack, although an appeal nunc pro tune
will not be granted. The rule is different, however, and an appeal
nunc pro tune can be granted when the petitioner has been found
guilty of first degree murder on a plea of guilty.' 2 1 The reason for
this exception is that the Commonwealth may be required to prove
the constituent elements of first degree murder and the receipt of
such evidence is beyond the scope of a Post Conviction Hearing Act
proceeding.1
22
With regard to the voluntariness of the plea of guilty, the
United States Supreme Court held in Boykin v. Alabama"23 that
it is reversible error for a trial judge to accept a guilty plea without
an affirmative on-the-record showing that the plea was volun-
tarily and intelligently made. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Commonwealth v. McBride" 4 states the Pennsylvania rule as
being that "in a silent record case" tried before Boykin (June 2,
1969) "a collateral proceeding may be held, but the Commonwealth
will have the burden of demonstrating that the plea was volun-
tary. '1" 25 Since the on-record colloquy 126 between the judge and
118. Id. at 599, 240 A.2d at 540.
119. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alexander, 435 Pa. 33, 255 A.2d 119
(1969); Commonwealth v. Culpepper, 434 Pa 15, 252 A.2d 624 (1969);
Commonwealth v. Walters, 431 Pa. 74, 244 A.2d 757 (1968); Common-
wealth v. Stokes, 426 Pa. 265, 232 A.2d 193 (1967).
120. See cases cited in note 119 supra.
121. See Commonwealth v. Zaffina, 432 Pa. 428, 24 A.2d 5 (1968).
122. Id.
123. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
124. No. 415. Jan. Term, 1969, Pennsylvania Supreme Court (Jan. 30,
1970). The decision in this case has since been reargued before the same
court and is pending.
125. Id.
defendant or attorney and defendant is of comparatively recent ori-
gin, the Commonwealth's burden will prove to be a heavy one. The
effect of the rule seems to be that, where the petitioner has been in
jail for some length of time and the trial participants are dead or
have no notes or other independent recollection, then not only will
it be impossible to prove voluntariness of the plea, but a new trial




If our present post conviction system functioned perfectly,
the only time a prisoner would be able to take a valid petition
would be when a constitutional right was not recognized until
after his conviction or when he later discovered exculpatory evi-
dence. Prisoners who executed direct appeals would be barred
from later raising other issues by the waiver standard of the
Post Conviction Hearing Act. Prisoners who knew of their right
to direct appeal, but chose to forego it, would be barred under
either the waiver or the prior litigation standards of the Post
Conviction Hearing Act. Indeed it seems just a matter of time
until we reach this point. However efficient such a system may
be, it seems insufficient when one can be deprived of receiving
even one review on the merits of alleged violations of his consti-
tutional rights. Seemingly, an evidentiary hearing is in order
when balancing a procedural waiver 128 against a possible uncon-
stitutional conviction and sentence. Our present system does not
always allow for even that one hearing.
Because of the great volume of petitions submitted to the
Commonwealth, the dignity of the petition has been reduced, while
the costs of its administration have increased. A possible solution
to both is to implement a system where a prisoner would get at
least one review on the merits of his conviction and sentence, even
if he had procedurally waived that right. Such a suggestion seems
more rational when one realizes that the rejection of a petition on
procedural grounds means an appeal or a new petition in either the
state or federal court, with the attendant loss of man hours and the
eventual possibility of the evidentiary hearing which was origi-
nally denied.
The first petition could be both meaningful and time saving
provided that the prisoner was adequatey counseled. Systematic
availability of pre-petition counseling could come from lawyers
and law students, if bar associations, law schools, and legal aid
126. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 319 and comment thereto.
127. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Culpepper, 434 Pa. 15, 252 A.2d 624
(1969); Commonwealth v. Hull, 427 Pa. 614, 235 A.2d 347 (1967); Common-
wealth ex rel. West v. Myers, 423 Pa. 1, 222 A.2d 918 (1966).
128. Although the knowing and understanding waiver is designed to
be a factual test, it seems that the effect of the presumption of waiver is
to return this issue to a nrocedural status.
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offices maintain the necessary degree of cooperation. A most de-
sirable result would be maintenance of a full time staff available
to prisoners who have complaints. A thorough search of the record
for legal bases along with client supplied factual bases, should
lead to a more meaningful and comprehensive petition than is
presently being filed by prisoners. Anything not raised on this
one petition would then be treated as waived for purposes of re-
view unless it was based on a retroactive post-petition decision or
on sufficient later-discovered exculpatory evidence. The best re-
sult from such a system would be that by providing the prisoner
with one meaingful review, we could then be sure that he had
knowingly and deliberately waived his right to raise any other
issues.
JAmEs A. YOUNG
